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II. It is more diffigult to reconcile what has been held by dif-
ferent courts as to the necessity of an invention having been
reduced to actual practice. That it must have been so reduced
under some circumstances, there can be no doubt. From
the dicta uttered in the cases of Seymour v. Osborne, and Pitts
v. ]remple, cited above, and Mloodman V'. Stimpson, "1 Fisher
98, it would seem, however, that there may be cases in which
it would be found sufficient to embody the supposed inven-
tion in an apparatus so complete that it would be employed
for busincss purposes to accomplish the work intended. - In
addition to these, the language of Judge SroRaY, in lMaswbi rn
v. Gould, 3 Story 122, may be adduced. "At any rate lie is
the inventor who is entitled -to a patent, who first brought
the machine to perfection, and made it capable of ueful
operation." p. 133. And also his utterances in Reed v. Cutler,
1 Story 590: "In a race of diligence between two indej,en-
dent inventors, he who first. reduces the invention to a fixed,
positive and practical form, would seem to be culil -4 to a
priority of right to a patent therefor;" thus appar,.i l rc-
cognizing a practical machine as a reduction to Imictice, p.
599. On the other hand, lie holds, on p. 510'-" Uwder our
patent laws, no person who is not the first, a, well a-4 the
original inventor, by whom the invention has beeii j-rloo~ed
and put in actual use, is entitled-to a l01l.Y A coit ,arI -a
of the last two quotations will teach ts how rcaih" Y x:.-'Z-
sions may be employed which seem to reco :z.' "'l - ','c
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incorporation of an idea into a material, operative form, as
sufficient without its being tested in work, at the very time
when no intention of dispensing with that requisite is enter-
tained. It is evident that no expressions like those cited
above, which were made without reference to the question,
should be relied on to sustain the doctrine under discussion.
.Again, in Ransom v. Mayor, 1 Fish. 252, these remarks are
attributed to Judge HALL: "The party who embodies the
principle, and makes it- available for practical use, is the
party who is entitled to a patent, and to protection under the
patent law." p. 270. It may be doubted whether he intended
by this to negative the idea that it was necessary that the
embodiment should have been put in practice, since nothing
in the case called for such an expression. In Parkhurst v.
Kinsman, 1 Blatchf. 488, Judge NELSON'S language was this:
"To constitute a prior invention the party alleged to have
produced it must have proceeded so far as to reduce his idea
to practice, and embodied it in some distinct form. It
must have been carried into practical operation, for he is en-
titled to a patent, who, being an original inventor, has first
perfected the invention, and adapted it to practical use." p.
494. ( FVide Post. 677). In Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 7
Wall. 583,we have the views of the highest tribunal as con-
veyed by CLIFFORD, J.: "He is the inventor, and is entitled
to a patent, who first brought the machine to perfection, and
made it capable of useful operation." p. 602. We have them
also in words about the same, of NELSON, J., in Whitely v.
Swayne. Id. 685: "For he is the first inventor, and entitled
to a patent, who, being an original discoverer, has first per-
fected and adapted the invention to actual use." p. 687.
These grave declarations coming fromi such high authorities,
deserve serious consideration; and if we could only be assur-
ed that they were uttered with reference to the principle of
jaw under discussion, they would increase the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the true doctrine. But it is by no
means certain that those who pronounced them had in view
the question whether the inventions spoken of had been in
actual use or not. There is indeed no intimation that the
distinction between an invention embodied in an apparatus
capable of use, and a machine put into actual practice, was
adverted to in any of these cases. In Woodman v. Stimpson,
1 Fish. 98, however, an enunciation of the law is given which
nearly amounts to a denial of the supposed requirement of
use: "They must have been working machines, not mere ex-
periments. They must have done work, or been capable of
doing work, and not have been mere experiments, afterward
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abandoned. "Wh ether they were in fact operated ft)r a greater
or less time is of no iluportanee, except so fIu' a.s that may
tend to make you believe that theY were or were not mere
experiments; in that view the tact is of conseluence. But
if vou are satistied that they were mnaehins capable of doing
work, substantially- by the same arra'g Ie's as the plain-
tiff's actual working machines, ilwu tie iaet that they were
operated but a short time, and then abandoned for other rea-
sons than because they h.uitl tailed a-: aiiahiinel-. is of no 'con-
sequence." p. 105. "(Lo'L., J.). Yet oi examination it
will be seen that something besides mere experiments in the
operation of the machine is called for.
Two eases are reported in which the qute:tion would appear
to have beeui the express subject of consideration. In one of
these, Par'r v. FIr:/,yaon, 1 Blatchf. 407, it was shown on
the part or the defense that a water-wheel, similar in construc-
tion to the patented one, had beeni made for a customer a
number of years previous, and carried away by him to be
put into a miill. The presiding judge charged the jury that
they might find that the patented wheel was wanting in no-
velty without evidence that the other had been actually used.
The report is unusually brief, and the reasons upon which
these instructions were founded, are not hinted at. The pa-
tent was dated in 1829, the trial took place in 1849; yet no-
thing is said ol the sulbject of the abandonment of the old
wheel, although there must have been a strong presumption
to that effect from .the lapse of time. The ease stands in
striking contrast with that of Parker v. f[ulne, hereafter
cited, p. 669. which was brought upon the same patent, and
when we compare with it the marked caution with which
the evidence of a previous construction was there received,
we cannot resist the conjecture that the report in Parker v.
.r,.,!,, ,o, is very imlpefect, and great hesitation must bo
felt in relYing- upon it. Tiifj dolht will be increased when
the ruhim, of. the -ame learned jurist, in Bool ,, v. ,Sdlzy, 1
Blaiehl'. 445, is read.
The other case is C,:'in v. ., len, 3 Fish. 640. which has
sometinies beciu cited as dlefermininir that it is not necessarv
to show that a device has beei in lm'e in order 1,) dt.Rbat *a
patent for it, obtained hy another mm terward. The learneil
judgie who presided laidilown no such doctrine, however,
but rather appears to havc held the contrary. Ile lid say,
indeed, that the invention might be shown to be complete,
"without being put to use in the general acceptation of that
word." His view was that the only object of proving a use
was to demonstrate the completeness of the invention, and
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that this might be shown by something short of use as "gen-
erally understood." The learned judge expressly recognized,
at the same time, the necessity of showing a prior use, but
considered it as having been made out under the circum-
stances. These, he said, "must be regarded substantially as
a use of the reversing mechanism." Some hesitation may
be felt as to the soundness of this conclusion; the decision,
it is clear, can hardly be cited as an authority against re-
quiring proof of use in such cases.
It must be conceded, nevertheless, that the language of the
learned judge lends countenance to the idea that the primary,
perhaps the only object of insisting that it should be shown
that what is alleged to have anticipated the patentee in his
invention was employed in work, is to establish that it was
a complete and practical embodiment of it. If that be all, it
follows that other proof of its completeness may be substi-
tuted. Now, there is no question but that proof of such
employment has been treated as material in this country as
well as in England, when the question has been raised whether
the former embodiment was a mere experime&t, or was a
perfected machine. An extensive examination of the re-
orted cases will make one thing clear, however, which can
ardly be reconciled with the view taken in the ease men-
tioned. In nearly every instance in which the defendant has
claimed that the invention had been made by some one else
before the patentee, he has been called upon, as an indispensa-
ble condition, to show that it had been put in use; and this
has been insisted upon without any reference to the com-
pleteness or imperfection of the former embodiment of it,
and even where iio such quegtion was raised. The proof has
been held essential on an entirel.Y- distinct gound; becau.se it
is prescribed by the statute. And it is so prescribed for the
same reason that it was in the Englislh system, in order that
the knowledge of it by the public might be insured.
Ia vatson v. Bladen, 4 Wa.h. 580, it Was the very question
m.vle by the plaintiff's couniel that the machine, which the
defendant claimed to have been an anticipation of the one
patented, had never been in u.-e. And the court admitted the
principle, but held that the evidence -,vas not sufficient to sus-
ta:n the plea. The objection had also been taken that the
prior machine was imperfect, and it was answered ion
grou.nds entirely distinct from thait of it. completeness having
beei demonstrated by its sucesfIul operation. The ncce.ssity
of its being shown to have bc',n wor'ked was foune'lel alo-
geiher on the language of the statute. Jadge W.ksrmxcvoT,
when taking up the question, says: "But the point mainly
. 668
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relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel is that no evidence was
c yIel liat Ohritiau's machine was ever used within the true
w-wi , iJV ' f luct Xjl'9i'f n 11w patent lawo." p. 583. There
".; at the siglte4 indication that such . " idcnC Was called
foe, in orid " to re.l the charge that the machine was not
1 ,io.illv successfl. The views of Judge Sroiiy on this
qi.:ion ina.- b. gathered from this launguage of his in Bed-
fr I v. iii w, 1 Mason 302. "Everysub),e -c luent palentee, al-
th it £h an ori,'inal inventor, may b defealed of his patent
ri filt uO;l proof of his prior invention behig put in usc' p.
3. Th e ii: cut of Ihe statute was to guard against defeating
1, -ents lh,- sein-g up a prior invention which had never been
re l;0A t'o pla'w ice (p. 305); not, it seems, to repel the pre-
slualption of iinl)erf'eion arising from its abandonment.
A 11 al. o from what fell from his lips ih Reed v. Cuttr, 1 Story
5 J,): "Under our patent law, no person who is not the first,
a- well as the original inventor, by whom the invention has
been perfected, and put in actual use, is entitled to a patent."
p. 596. While it is true that in both these cases the earlier
embodiments of the invention were charged with not being
effective, the-fact that they had been in operation was not
once alluded to as a refutation of the charge. Other means
were taken to show that they were capable of accomplishing
their proposed functions. That they had not been in use was
taken up as an independent objection to their being inter-
po.sed as a bar to the plaintiff!s patent. It was treated not
only as an independent, but as in itself a sufficient answer to
the defense. It was met in fine, not by proof that the ma-
chines were practical and effective, but by proof that they-
had been actially employed in business, as the only way of
satisfying the court that the inventions were not new when
patented as required by the statute.
In Parker v. Hulmne, 1 Fish. -14, again, an attempt was
madc to show that a wheel similar to that for wich lhe
plaintiff held a patent had been. made before the palen.ee
originated it. lespecting this, the presiding Judic, K.Axs,
gave these instructions to the jury: "One poi'tioa of Mrr.
IIutlnes' testimony call4for this remark, that it is no, elou'rh
fol. the defendant to show that wheels like the patoele 1 O'eS
w'u1e ma./.,ut thathei must also h.)v lwint t h3v wrc'e , br!'"e
th, ,,aiwilrs invenioflo. .7113 it; 1 A. W watt is r'f't'> 1
to , fefqt the 1i, ()f a pate.n.e of an iflpr,v'l ma 4h;v'. J' dhe
p:'cet cage, ioreover, the mIee poof of the use of s:eh
I 'hicel, would not suflice, uile , it wa'I5 also pro'c I tlmlf w 'er
wa. intro'hueed into the wh.'el with ilhe proper dire'lou
given to it, as otherwise it could not have involved.the prin-
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ciple of the improvement patented." It will be observed
that the first rule is laid down as one of universal application,
irrespective of its bearing upon the circumstances in proof
before him; that the prior alleged invention should have
been in actual use is declared to be the test in all cases. The
propriety of insisting that the water must have been intro-
duced into the wheel in a certain manner will be manifest
when it is understood that the means of introducing it thus
constitutes an essential f6ature of the invention. It is this
which makes the report of Parker v. Ferguson, seem so mea-
ger and renders it probable that it falls short of representing
the most important incidents of that trial
There are other cases in which the invention set up as
having anticipated the one on which the suit was founded,
was charged with being an abandoned experiment, and there
was on the other hand evidence of its having been employed
in actual work; yet the terms in which the court discuss the
effect of that evidence, cannot fairly be considered as attach-
ing no other importance to it but that of refuting. the charge
thus made. They plainly look upon actual use as a neces-
sary requisite to the sufficiency of such a defense in every
instance; and they lay it down as a general rule that to ren-
der a former embodiment of a principle a bar to a patent, it
must have been in employment for business purposes.
To expatiate at equal length on all th e cases in which this
subject has been agitated, would be regarded as tedious, and
seems unnecessary. It will probably be deemed sufficient to
give brief extracts from some of the opinions pronounced in
them, especially since they bear the same character with
those already quoted-that of legal principles, or rules of
universal application. For instance, in Afany v. Jagger,
1 Blatchf. 372, Judge NELSON'S language was, without any
qualifying terms: "The new idea must be reduced to some
practical use before it can be relied on to defeat a patent."
p. 283. That of Judge GRIER, in Winans v. N. Y. & H. .
Co., 31 Jo. Fr. Inst. N. S. 3d Ser. 316, Was this: "It is not
the person who has produced the idea that is entitled to pro-
tection as an inventor, but the person who has embodied the
idea into a practical machine, and reduced it to practical use."
p. 352. Although it was claimed in these cases that what
was set up as anticipating the plaintiff's discovery had been
given up, yet it will be perceived that the quotations are not
qualified by any reference to that circumstance. They are
uttered as principles governing on all such occasions. In
other cases, from which extracts will be given, it is not im-
possible that a similar answer was made to the same defense.
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There is not the slightest allusion to it in the reports, how-
ever, "Id tile expressions used by the learned Judge are the
more conlidenll" to be regarded as unrestricted in their bear-
ing. Judge WA.isixitrox, in Pennock v. Dialoyue, 4 Wash-
538, when speaking of what had been set up asa counterpart
of the patented device produced before it by one Bedford, re-
marked as follows: "If they are the same in principle, but
Bedford's wa- never in use before the plaintiff's invention,
then it cinnot impeach the validity of their patent." p. -343.
In A ll;,harpe v. Robinson, 2 Fish. 83, Judge IXGERSOLL,
declared his views in this manner; "To constitute such a
prior invention as will avoid a patent that has been granted,
it must be made to appear that some one: before the patentee,
not only conceived the idea of doing what the patentee has
done, but also that be has reduced the idea to practice, and
embodied it in some practical and useful form. The idea
must have been carried into practical operation." p. 85. And
again Judge INGERSOLL said in Poppenhauser v. . Y.
G. P. Comb Co. 2 Fish. 62; "Or if, gentlemen, before
the invention of Meyer, either Goodyear, or any one else, at
Roxbury, did invent the same thing, and pUt the same ir(
actual practice, 1 lay emphasis on that, put the same in practice,
in such an event the light granted to feyer Was void." p. 68.
We pass to other cases in which the requisites prescribed
must have been irrespective of there being any presumption,
arising from disuse, that the supposed previous invention
was incomplete, since there was nothing in the proof to sug-
gest it, and the declaration of the judges could have had no
reference to that subject. They seem to be applicable on
every occasion where the objection that the invention was an
old one, is raised against the patent. The terms employed by
Judge NELSON in Foote v. S71sby, 1 Blatchf. 445. are especially
wol-iy of notice in view of his rulings in Parklhurst v. Kfis-
InMn, and Parker v. Fi";/UsOn, cited in previous pages, 6(6;-7.
"T'he person who first reduces the idea to praetieal applica-
ti,m an' use is entitled to the patent." 1).4654. He thus ex-
cludes the one who has merely given it a for1 capal)ble of
application. So in (Y,,)t v. Mass. Arois (0,. 1 Fish. 108, Judge
WooDuRY, mat kes the observation, "It is no matter whether
the prior inventions vere patented or uot, if the%- existed, if
they were discovered, if they were used." p. 115. Still more
decisive is the pbraseology of Judge LExvI' ini AS Wit V. I]Ili-
sen, 3 Fish. 343: "As has been well said by the counsel,
that which a person perfects, or invents, and applies to a
practical use, that is to be regarded as the invention, and the
mere knowledge by an individual of a prior mechanical
REDUCING AN INVENTION TO PRACTICE.
structure similar to the one patented, which has not been
usdl)ractically, would not be al answer to the novelty of the
patent." p. 360. Judge (iTLES delivered his sentiments to tile
same efifect in Singer)v. 1VralMseY, 1 Fish. 658: "For the law
is t hat whoever perfects a machine, and brings it into useful
operation, is entitled to the patent, and is the real inventor."
p. 532. He thus equally excludes him who has gone no
further than to make a practical machine, without using it.
So atso Judge Diiumno-xD, in Cox v. Grfqs, 2 Fish. 174: "It
is nece:ary in order to ])revent a man from having the bene-
fit of his patent, that ano':her should have first discovered
the thing, and reduced it to actual practice," p. 177.
In order to assist us in frr~aing a just estimate of the sig-
nifi Aneca nl bearing of the discrepant opini.:ns which have been
referrel to on this branch of the subject, it is worth while,
before passing to another part of it, to call attention more
particularly to the marked contrast between the two classes.
Alnong those first cited there is but one, Pitts v. Vimj)le,
ante 617, in which the distinction between a mere e:nbodi-
ment of an invention in a working machine, on the one
'hand, and an actual employment in business transactions, on
the other, can be safely asserted to have been present in the
mind. How readily an opinion might! be expressed in such
terms as to countenance the sufficiency of the former, without
considering the necessity of the latter, can be easily imagined.
and was illustrated by the quotations from Judge Sroiy's
decision in Peed v. Cutter 665, ante 665. But in every instance
where the employment of the device in actual work has been
insisted on, it.is evident that the distinction has been clearly
in view. In several of them it is the very principle that is
sought to b enforced. The authorities upon one side are to
a great extent mere incidental expressions, which may have
been intended to assert the doctrine they are supposed to in-
volve, or they may not. The others ire for the most part
une'luivocal, and arc manifestly do .igncd to assert the princi-
ple in support of whicl they arc cited.
ITT. Anothier re-fuisite i cz c mnn )UV supl))Ce to b3 assential in
order to rendlor Ih previous c-i 'ence of the inentioa in the
hia:ik of' ohrrs thri Ih j:a'e. ce lh-8t1 to his tiile; Ilhnt it
, l hlve b- a. m)'tb. u ;c. B.' i." 'is to i u;1 lerstoc'1,
a' a [Ii'.,. ,-' il puh! i .x1 i ' a u1o by
th bi4.Th , oi. -l Woil whi:.l swl~e 't cairi dis-
tii ju i uc :e j ii ia :l - .,-" i, i (,/n* I v. HIunt., I [as.
38:2, d1'.:il in 1 IT, anl ar-.jt,: i'el. 1t wa, ,.,ivl that
th article mnonooDlieZ l by tho pin-ntiiY ha b, m:um'.h,:
turxl nmany years bfore he originated it. The principal
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qu. tion on the trial was as to the extent to Wvhich it must
have ben used in ord,'r to renler tile patent void." Jtulge
Sroay- an;we;'e.1 ihc question thus: "B.ti. if the fir'st inventor
re.hwo.l hi. ileory to practice, and put 1ii hi aclhine or other
invuittion into use, the law never could intenad that the greater
or le. - use, in which it might. be, or the more or less widely
tli knowledge of its existence might circulate, should con-
si .ate the critecion b~y which to decide upon the validity of
all* sub.equent 1)atent toe, the same iniveato." p. 305. Tihis
dee'.ioc)n wi foun,le.l UI)oil th3 statutc of 17J6 ; but after the
pa ",zg, of that of 18:3i, he h.ld the saleilootrine even more
uc iluivocally in Real v. (atll %, Story 5)0,declaring himnielf
in ih .,e terms: "If the invention is perlfc:ed and put intoacual use by the first ainl o,'iginal invento,, it is of no cn-
se f-anco whether tile invention is exten iv,ly knovn or used,
or whether tile knowle:lge or u.e thereof is limited to a few
per. ons,, or even to the lirs inventor himsclf." p. 596. And
in connection with this he took occasion to pronounce Dol-
ken Fs case not a "just exposition of the patent law of this
country, however correctly it may have been decided under
that of England." p. 598.
Whatever disposition to treat these decisions as obso-
lete may be felt, they have ben clearly recognizeI,. and their
authoeity acknowled'ged in cases of too late a period and of
too high a character to allow of their being disregarded. In
Gayier v. lWille,; 10 How. 477, decided in 1850, the subject
must have been under consideration in the Supreme Court of
the United States. In determining the case several points
were noticed, which, after all, cannot be esteemed very sig-
nificant; such as that the producer of the safe, which it was-
alleged was made before that of' the patentees, never became
aware of the value of his inveution; that its construction
was unknown to others, though, aj was remarked, the me-
chanic; who ma-le it imust h'tv been cognizant of it. It is
di. lilt to see th.t much im, ebrtaneec'f.[ 1)3 attachel1 to
ti ;3 all o:h r i!Li~l$ c,).n n Ine.I up.on. When the very
able jurikt who prloaou'lc th13 Jul imn.3dt of thme court, 1h1ef
Justie lT-A.NgY, c-ne to disc,; i h kii 0;ort e.F lhe cxpre.;zioa in
the six.h sec0ioil of1 the law ([ 16-J3, " not kmown or une l by
o hr's l)ft)re his ior their ill''..tio.i or di.:'cverv," he tfaa 1d
lI:s in.c,'prea.ion of it lpo. tlip o! c ill th fifeea.h s :.m i-,
ill which it is ):.ovid! I thtug a 1) 4":l.:3l1l I not ll h 1 I void
on aec ll1 or Ime inv l'i ).l . 4.,;," knywu.- oi ul 1 :)'c .o, 1. if
th i Wt t e w " it ax t,- oi it. IL i1~'.* 1 3 1 :hi 1.t
to ca'i'lo himna.e to a 1-m'e u, an o:'iginal disoovorer of al ::n-
provement need not be in a strict senlse the first inveutor,
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since his title could not be impeached although the improve-
ment had been made by others before him. He said, there-
fore, that "the clause in question" (that contained in the
fifteenth section) "qualifies the words before used" (those
quoted from the sixth)," and shows that by knowledge and
use the Legislature meant knowledge and use existing in a
manner accessible to the public." p. 457. Now, if the jud-
ment of the court had been made to turn on this interpreta-
tion, and the Conner safe -had been pronounced no bar to the
patent in suit, on the ground that it was not accessible to the
public, it would have been a reversal' of the doctrine ad-
vanced in Bedford v. Hunt and Reed v. Cutter. And if that
doctrine was not approved by the court there could have been
no fairer opportunity to have set the profession right in rela-
tion to it. But apart from the quotation given above there
is not the slightest allusion to it. On the contrary the deci-
sion assumes that the Connor safe was prima facie fatal to
plaintiff's title; but asserts that it had' ceased to have that
effect because the jury must be presumed to have found that
it had been forgotten, and buried in oblivion, like a lost art.
The learned judge even holds this remarkable language con-
cerning it: "We do not un(.erstand the Circuit Court to.have
said that the omission of Connor to try the value of his safe
by proper tests would deprive it of its priority; nor his omission
to bring it into public use. He might have omitted both, and
also abandoned its use, and been ignorant of the extent of its
value; yet if it was the same as Fitzgerald's, the latter could
not, upon such grounds, be entitled to a patent; provided
Connor's safe- and its mode of construction, were still in the
memory of Connor before they were recalled by Fitz-
gerald's patent." p. 498. In other words, Connor's safe was
a bar to a patent for the same improvement to any subsequent
inventor of it, so long as Connor remembered its construc-
tion, notwithstanding it had never been in public use. Con-
sidering that the decision turned on the knowledge of Connor's
safe haing been lost, and not on its having been kept secret,
it is very manifest that the court felt the weight of Judge
STORY's decisions, and it was to avoid the effect of them that
they resorted to the expedient of treating Connor's safe as
having been forgotten.
In Rich v. Lippincott, 2 Fish. 1, which was tried two or
three years after Gayler v. W ilder, the validity of the patent
for Fitzgerald's safe was again contested before Judge GRIER.
In his instructions to the jury he emphatically re-asserted
the doctrine advanced in Bedford v. Hunt and Reed v. Cutter,
going so far as to adopt the very language quoted above from
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the former report. There can be little doubt, therefore, that
the law of those cases was in the minds of the court when
they had that of Gayler v. Wilder under consideration. The
same question must have arisen also in Cahowan v. Ring, 1
Fish. 397, and 1 Cliff. 592, which was tried before Judge
CLIFFORD in 1859, and at subsequent times. It was shown
by the defendant that before the plaintiff made his inveiition,
one Luce had constructed a perifct machine embodying it.
It would seem that it was kept secret; but it is evident that
this was not deemed sufficient to prevent its operating fatally
against the suit. The court, therefore, adolpted a course simi-
lar to that pursued in Gayler v. Vilder, and charged the jury
that, whether it had been used or not, if it had been broken
up, and its materials used for other purposes, or lost (of all
which there was proof), and its construction was only re-
called to the memory of the maker by the present contro-
versy, etc., its existence would not invalidate Cahoon's patent.
(p. 411). The learned .judge must therefore have regarded
the secret existence of the machine as in itself a bar to a
patent obtained by any subsequent inventor, unless that ob-
jection were removed in the way he pointed out. Again in
fHall v. Bird, 3 Fish. 595, tried before Judge BLATCHFORD in
1867, the prior machine, upon which the defendant relied,
had always been kept carefully secluded from observation.
Yet this- was manifestly considered as not a sufficient answer
to it. Instead of pronouncing against it on the ground that
it had never been in public use, the court laid hold of cir-
cumstanco from which they condemned it as an abandoned
experiment. And they cite at length the case of Gay/er v.
Wilder as analogous to the one before therp, and as sustaining
their decision.
Judge STORY'S doctrine ha- also been supposed to have
been directly affirmed in Co!]in v. 0.en, 3 Fish. 610; but
this is not borne out by a careful examination of th rel)ort.
It was ruled by the court th-at an exhibition of the alleged
previous invention to two or three persons was equivaleut to
givihv the knowledge of it to the public. The necessity of
a public use of it was distin)tly -recognized, therefore, al-
though the evidence by which it was held to have been made
out, might not generally be held sufficient.
If" the doctrine has never been asserted anew in any of our
courts in express terms since the ease of Reed v. Ceter, it
has never, on the other hand, been condemned in any instance
in'which it was the proper subject of adjudication. And an
elementary writer of high authority evidently entertains an
opinion in conformity to it. In the 3d edition of Curtis on
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Patents may be found this sentence: "If the thing patented
has once been actually and completely invented or discovce ed
before, however limited the use, the patent is invalidated," e, c.,
Sec. 87. Again, when speaking of some English decisions,
it is said: "If we examine the facts of the several cases, and
the tests applied to ihem, taking care to remember that under
our lMw bn the question of novelty, the publicity of the prior
use is itt otherwise important than as a circumstance tending
to show -hat there was Or was not a completed invention,"
etc. See. 88. He has nowhere declared his opinion more ex-
pliitlv, it is true; but what. his views are. is evident enough.
While this matter has not b3cl made the subject of any
distinct adljudication of late, there have been several occasions
in which remarks have fallen from the bench, plainly indi-
cating that a diaterent view of the law -,a:, entciiained: The
first extract, which was given from the opinion of Judge
TANEY in Gayler v. BVilde, (Ante. 673) shows that such
were his impressions, although he avoided a conflict with the
authority of those cases. In H7aselden v. Ogden, 3 Fish. 378,
Judge SaERM rNA in a brief summary of the law u pon the
subject included this principle: "The prior use of an invention
must be a public use and npt a private use. If an invention
is made and used in a private way, and tlhen thrown aside,
and not given to the- public, a patent granted to a subsequent
inventor would be a valid patent." p. 380. In Adams v. BJ-
wards, 1 Fish.- 1, Judge WOODBURY, after commenting upon
the effect of using an invention two years, leaves that subject
and proceeds thus: "If a man has an invention, and nobody
knows of it, then the use of it cannot deba another person
from inventing or patenting it." p. 12.
The expression of theie opinions so widely differing from
those of Judge SroRY, justify an inquiry into the grounds on
which his were founded. The only reason he gives for them
is to be found in that clause of the law which, as he says,
",expressly declarei that the applicant for a patent must be
the first as well as an original inventor." - In support of-this
he quotes from his own opinion in Penn,)& v. Dialoge, 2
Pet. 1, where he sai th3 Pih. it Act " gives the right to the
firx, awl true invea'.o-, arol to him only ; if known of used
b.&)e-e his su)ipose-1 di cov3.-y, he ii not he first, althonghll he
may b3 the true inventor, aan'[ fhat is the case to which the
claul;e looks," p. 23. Now it is a li-ttle renarkable that the
v--y sa-n3 ex)resion. is ui-[ ia ithc English S:atute of
M:aopolie. which re!tricts thme .,n-at of a pa:i'ct "to :1e
true and first inventor." Oar statute reals, "the original
REDUCING AN INVENTION TO PRACTICE. 677
and first inventor ;" but the learned judge lays no stress on
the word original; in fact, he uses it as interchangeable with
the word true iu the last extract. It is the more remarkable
because it was in this very case of Pennock v. Dialogue that
he explained how greatly we were dependent upon the eon-
struction of the English law for the proper interpretation of
our own as mentioned on a former page. (612.) He said
further on that occasion, "The wods of our statute are not
identical witht those of the statute of James, but it can scarcely
admit of a doubt that they must have been within the con-
templation of those by whom it was framed, as well as the
construction which haa been put upon them by Lord OoIE."
p. 20. There is not one expression in the Statute of Mo-
nopolies the meaning of which had become better settled than
that of the words "first inventor," as may be seen from the
quotation made from Dolland's Case, ante p. 614. According
to Lord LYNDHJ.URST'S remark in Househill Co. v. eilson ,
already quoted, "The first person who discloses the inven-
tion to the public is the first inventor." No reason can be
suggested why this construction was not contemplated by
those who framed the Act of 1836, and why it was not
intended to be embodied in it as much as the construction
upon another point adopted by Lord COKE. Such indeed
has been the import attached to the phrase by our own
courts. A large portion of the reasoning of the court in
Gayler v. Wilder is addressed to this very subject, and is
intended to show that it is not to ba interpreted literally, but
is to be applied properly to the one who brings a discovery
to the knowledcge of the public. How common itis to attach
this meaning to the phrase may ba seea on recurring to the
extracts which have been given from the decisions in &'y.
monr v. Osborne, ante p. 617, Mlashbtrn v. Gmld, p. W35,
Alawam Co. v. Jord n, p. 66$7, 1T' hitely v. Swayn, p. 633, and
,Singer v. 17abnsey, p. 672. Another may b adde] on
account of its espoial pertinency from the decision of Judge
f-Ixi in Ransoan v. AVayor, 1 Fish. 252. "If the ]lainuqfs
di. not use reasonable diligence to perfect the iuvea-ion
pat ted after the idea of it was first conceive. and
in the meantime other persons not only conceived the idla,
but pertcted the invention, and practically applied it to
public use before the invention of the plaintiffs ha-l beu
so far perfected that it could be applied to practical use,
the plaintit' patent is void, becauo they were not ihe" first
and oririnal inventors of the thing P'atelted." p. 272.
Another thing which secem to have had its influence in lc:td-
ing Judge STORY to his conclusion, is the provision contained
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in the Acts of 1793 and of 1836, for determining contro-
versies between two conflicting applications. This introduced
into our system a feature undoubtedly new, though since
adopted to some extent in that of Great Britain. But it went
no further than to settle the contest between two competitors,
and to provide means for ascertaining which is entitled to
the patent. It introduced no change in'the principles upon
which priority of invention is to be determined. That is left
to be ascertained by the same criteria as in a 'trial at law
upon the validity of a pitent. There is not a word in either
of the statutes that countenances the idea that by a prior in-
ventor is meant anything else than the person who shows
that he is the man whom the courts would adjudge to be the
rightful patentee; not a syllable that countenances the sup-
position that the person intended is he who has conceived
the invention, but has never reduced it to practice, whatever
progress he has made short of that toward perfecting it.
We fail, therefore, to discover in what was alleged by
Judge STORY or in any other quarter, the slightest reason
for dispensing with what is manifestly an essential feature in
any well-regulated patent system, and one which has been
commended to us by the long experience of the oldest one
known, that of Great Britain. It is the system which our
legislature adopted, and there is no indication that they did
not intend to embrace this principle as lwell as the rest. The
whole spirit of both seems to require that inducements should
be held out not merely to prosecute new inventions, but to
bring them before the world. The rewards each holds out
are intended for these who give their fellow-citizens the fruits
of their ingenuity, and it is an entire perversion to put such a
construction on our legislation as bestows those rewards on
the man who withholds them from his country.
In short, it defeats the principal object of requiring that
the former embodiment of an invention should have been
put in use in- order to invalidate a patent, which is that the
public should obtain a knowledge of it. That such is the
real object cannot be reasonably doubted, and should not be
forgotten. Bat to secure it the use must manifestly be a
public one. To require that it should have been in use, yet
allow a use in private to satisfy the requirement, involves an
absurdity.
Some scruple has been expressed (by DALLAs, J., for in-
stance, in Hill v. Thompson, W. P. 0. 29) as to the power of
the State to deprive a man of the privilege of using anew a
device which he had discovered before the patentee, and had
in actual use. No one ever thought, however, of its being
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wrong to deny such a privilege to the person who makes the
same discovery afterward, though his discovery is an inde-
pendent one. Yet he has just as good a title to the products
of his ingenuity as the one who anticipated the patentee.
The mere invention, or discovery, of the new idea gives no
exclusive right to it. It is the statute alone that vests the
title in the oril'inal inventor. And it vests itin him from whom
the country o;btains the benefit of it; she has no rewards for
any other. Whatever inchoate interest the original disco-
verer may be supposed to have must give way t 9 the right,
akin to that of eminent domain, under which the State ap-
propriates the discovery by whomsoever made, and vests it
exclusively in that inventor to whom the public is indebted
for making it known. And the rights of one who made the
discovery before him are no more sacred, and can no more
prevail against this action, on the part of the State, than the
rights of him who makes the discovery afterward.
To sum up this discussion, the following are the conclu-
sions at which we arrive:
1. Before an invention can be considered as having been so
reduced to practice as to. give its author, without further
effort on his part, an irrefragable title to it, if duly asserted,
it must have been embodied in a practical working machine,
capable of being operated to perform its intended functions
for business purposes. If not capable of such embodiment,
it must have been brought to an equivalent state of perfec-
tion in some other way. Upon this point there is no conflict
in our judicial tribunals.
2. The weight of the authorities is decidedly in favor of
requiring that such machine should have been put in actual
use for business purposes.
3. While, upon principle, it would seem that such use
should be in public, it must be confessed that many of the
decisions recognize a private use as sufficient.
Such are the results which seem necessarily to follow from
a somewhat extensive examination of the reports, although
they are not altogether such as were anticipated, nor such as
commend themselves to the judgment. No one will be more
gratified than the writer should it be found, upon a thorough
study of the cases, that they should be modified in essential
particulars. S. H. HODGES.
